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ADMILLTY-PPJiz CouRT PRocEEDixGs--PRoEr SuBJEcr To CONDEMNA-
TioN.-A German firm chartered a Russian sailing ship, on May 6, 1914, to
carry a cargo of nitrate from Chile to Europe, loading not to begin before
July 13, 1914. On that day, the Hamburg firm sold the cargo to the appellant,
a Dutch corporation, by a contract according to which the invoice price was
to be payable "go days after receipt of first bill of lading," or if the ship
arrived earlier, then "against acceptance of the documents." The appellant
was to name the port of arrival, and the cargo, after loading, was to be at its
risk. On August 6, the loading was completed, and the appellant was notified.
The German firm through their Chilean branch took the 3 bills of lading,
with the cargo deliverable to their order. On September 9 they deposited the
first bill of lading with their bank in Amsterdam, with instructions not to
turn over to the appellant the bills of lading until the invoice was paid. On
October 19, the German firm sent the appellant an invoice for the price, with
a statement that the amount was due December 9. The cargo was seized as
prize at Plymouth, December 6, but the appellant, unaware of the seizure, had
written to the German firm's bankers at Amsterdam, who then held two of
the bills of lading, enclosing the invoice price with instructions not to pay
over the money until they received the third bill of lading. This was received
on January 25, 1915, whereupon the bankers paid the German firm, and handed
all the bills of lading to the appellant. From the decision of Sir Samuel Evans,
President of the Prize Court, holding that the property had not passed to
the Dutch buyer, but remained in the German sellers and was subject to con-
demnation, an appeal was taken to the Privy Council. Held, that the cargo
was not subject to condemnation, property having passed to the Dutch buyer
when the loading was completed. The Parchim (1917, P. C) 117 L. T. 738.
The enemy character of goods seized as prize is determined by property,
not by risk. The Miramichi [1915] P. 71; The Odessa [Igi6] A. C. 145.
Intermediate lienors may carry all the risk of loss, yet may not have property.
Still, risk raises an important inference as to property, and a prima facie infer-
ence as between seller and buyer directly: Res perit domino. Martineau v.
Kitching (1872) L. R. 7 Q. B. 436, 453. In the instant case, interpreting the
contract and the intention of the parties, Lord Parker concluded that from
the moment the cargo was loaded and the Dutch buyer notified thereof, a
duty to pay arose, all risk of loss fell on the buyer, and the property passed
to it The buyer merely had a credit of ninety days from the time of arrival
of the first bill of lading in Europe for the actual payment of the purchase
price. The sellers did not retain any jus disponendi, as Sir Samuel Evans
concluded; but as security for the purchase price the sellers, throug4 their
bankers, were to retain control of the bills of lading, the evidence of title,
which were not to be turned over to the buyer until the purchase price was
paid. See Mirabita v. Imperial Ottoman Bank (1878) L. R. 3 Ex. D. 164;
Browne v. Hare (1858, Ex-)" 3 H. & N. 484. The Privy Council appears to
have correctly construed the contract as to the time when property was to
pass.
CARPIEs-AcrioN 3Y NoMaxAL C-aRmm AcaixsT CAIER in PossxssIoN-
LIAL=TY OVER AS BASIS OF REcovERY.-The plaintiff held himself out as a
carrier of freight by boat and received goods for transportation, chartering
for the purpose of carrying the goods the cargo space in a vessel owned and
operated by the defendant Because of the unseaworthiness of the ship, the
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cargo became a total loss, and the plaintiff brought suit for the value of
the cargo, on the warranty of seaworthiness in the charter-party. Held, that
the plaintiff, whether or not technically a bailee of the cargo, could recover the
amount claimed. Pendleton v. Benner Line (1918, U. S.) 38 Sup. Ct 330.
Like anyone who holds himself out as a carrier, though employing a sub-
contractor to perform the physical transportation, the plaintiff was under a
carrier's liability to the shipper. See Buckland v. Adams Ex. Co. (1867) 97
Mass. z24; Transportation Co. v. Bloch Bros. (1888) 86 Tenn. 392, 6 S. W.
881. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in the opinion, the right of a
bailee to recover full damages against a third person for a wrong affecting
the goods was for centuries rested on his liability over to the bailor. Whether
all bailees were ever under an insurer's liability to the bailor is by no means
clear; but as it became settled that the modern law imposed no such sweep-
ing liability, the courts, after a hard struggle to make the traditional explana-
tion of the right against third persons fit the various cases that arose, finally
abandoned the attempt, resting the right squarely on present or prior posses-
sion. See Brewster v. Warner (1883) 136 Mass. 57; The Winkfeld [1i90]
P. 42; see also Holmes, Common Law, 164 et seq.; 2 Pollock & Maitland,
History of Eng. Law (2d ed.) 17o et. -seq.; Bordwell, Property in Chattels
(i916) 29 HRv. L. Rnv. 731. But the traditional explanation failed, not
because liability over was not a sufficient basis for recovery, but because, in
the case of the ordinary bailee, it was too often lacking. In the principal case,
it was the element of present or prior possession that was lacking, or at least
doubtfuL But liability over being in fact present, both theory and precedent
justify the court in allowing recovery under the old theory. It is interesting
that the opinion should have been written by Mr. Justice Holmes, who perhaps
did more than anyone else to expose the fallacy of the old reasoning as applied
to bailees in general.
CoNmvcr or LAws - NEEcoTrlABL INsTRu srs - Ar ncATIox oF RENvoI
DocnmN.-Cotton brokers in Liverpool agreed -to buy cotton from a firm in
Alabama, and to accept drafts for the purchase price. In pretended compli-
ance with this contract the Alabama firm drew a draft on the purchasers' bank
in Liverpool, to which was attached a forged bill af lading for cotton, but no
cotton in fact was shipped. The draft with bill of lading attached was pur-
chased in good faith by the Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, which presented
it to the purchasers' bank in Liverpool for acceptance, and it was duly accepted
for account of the purchasers. The Guaranty Trust Co. then sold the accepted
draft in England, and it was later paid by the acceptors to the ultimate holder,
a London bank. On discovering the facts, the acceptors brought action against
the Guaranty Trust Co. in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York to recover back the amount paid. The case turned on
whether certain words in the draft referring to the contract for cotton made
it a mere conditional order as distinguished from a negotiable bill of exchange.
The District Court, applying American law, gave judgment for the acceptors,
which was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in a decision reported in
(19T3) 2io Fed. 81o, on the ground that the question of negotiability as against
the English acceptors was governed by English law, and that evidence of
that law was disregarded by the trial court. Pending a new trial in the District
Court, the Guaranty Trust Co. brought suit against the acceptors in the King's
Bench Division in England to obtain a declaratory judgment determining what
the English law was on the question at issue. Held, that the American decision
was binding on the parties in England to the extent of deciding that English
law governed, that the plaintiff in the English court was entitled to a declara-
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tion of the English law, that under the English law of Bills and Notes, the
acceptors would not be entitled to recover back what they had paid, but that
under the Conflict 6f Laws provision of the English Bills of Exchange Act,
English law "threw the parties back upon American law," and that under
American Bills and Notes law the acceptors would be entitled to recover.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co. [1918] 1 K. B. 43.
See Co~mmNrs, p. io46.
Coxmcr oF LAws--CAusE or Acviox AwIsIG IN A FoREIGN JUmsDIcrIoN-
EFFETc oF FomGN STATUTE oF LlmrrAoxs.--The plaintiff was owner of a
trestle bridge spanning a stream which was an international boundary. The
defendant's locomotive in Canada set fire to the bridge which was burned
and destroyed The Canadian statute applicable to the facts provided that
suit for such an injury "shall be commenced within one year and not after-
wards." Over five years had elapsed before the commencement of this action
in New Hampshire. Held, that the Canadian statute of limitations was not
a bar to the action. Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co.
(x918, N. H.) 1o3 Ati. 263.
The general Anglo-American view is that questions of limitation touch the
remedy and as such are to be determined by the lex fori. Huber v. Steiner
(1835, C. P.) 2"Bing. N. C. 2o2. It follows that an action may be brought on
a contract or tort at any time before the remedy is barred by the local statute
of the forum, although action has already been barred by the lex loci contractus
or solutionis or lex loci delicti. Harris v. Quine (1869) L. P- 4 Q. B. 653;
Townsend v. Jemison (i85o, U. S.) 9 How. 4o7. The rule is also applied to
a judgment obtained in a foreign jurisdiction. Fanton v. Middlebrook (i882)
5o Conn. 44. Nor does it violate the full faith and credit clause to deny
enforcement because the statute of the forum has run, although the judgment
would still be enforceable in the state where rendered. McElmoyle v. Cohen
(1839, U. S.) 13 Pet. 312. Upon the Continent, however, the time limit on
the enforcibility of an obligation is held a part of the obligation and hence
determined by the law of the obligation. Guthrie, Savigny, 22i. In the United
States a distinction has been made, based upon the residence of the parties,
which has presented an opportunity for approaching the Continental rule.
Where the statute of the state whose law governs the obligation is clearly
expressed as extinguishing the obligation, and both the parties have resided in
that state during the -whole period of the statute, the law of that state has
been applied in suits brought elsewhere. Brown v.. Parker (1871) 28 Wis. 2I;
Perkins v. Guy (1877) 55 Miss. 153, 177; Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed.)
sec. 582. This appears to be an over-refinement; if the statute purporting
to "extinguish" the obligation does extinguish it, the matter ceases to-be one
of procedure, and residence would become immaterial; whereas if such words
do not extinguish the obligation there seems little reason for the exception
based on residence. Where a right not existing at common law has been given
by statute, and its duration limited, the forum has very generally denied a
remedy after the expiration of that period, and this regardless of residence.
Eastwood v. Kennedy (1876) 44 M& 563. The same tendency to approach the
Continental view is indicated by state statutes expressly barring actions upon
obligations which have been barred in the jurisdictions where they arose. See
Holmes v. Hengen (i9o3, Sup. Ct.) 85 N. Y. Supp. 35. But upon the general
proposition that limitation is a matter of remedy the courts have been consistent
in their reasoning; many even of the preliminary questions, bearing on the
ultimate question whether the action is barred, are also determined- by the lex
for. Obear v. First Nat. Bank (1895) 97 Ga. 587, 25 S. E. 335 (provision
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requiring partial payment on a note to be entered thereon) ; Walsh v. Mayer
(1884) 11 U. S. 31 (form of acknowledgment necessary to take claim out
of the statute). Whatever may be said in favor of the Continental view,
our rule, as illustrated by the principal case, has at least the advantage of
uniformity. Any change which might be attempted, unless by statute under the
movement for uniform state laws, would be bound to be slow and partial.
CoNSTrruTiONAL LAw-Du PRocEss oF LAw-MuNIcIPAL REGULA oIr OF
THE SIZE OF BAKERS' LoAvs-The defendant below, a woman running a home
bakery and selling bread of her own make, was convicted of selling a loaf
weighing iiY4 ounces, in violation of an ordinance of the City of Toledo which
permitted the exposure for sale of bread in loaves of one pound and upward
"and in no other way." The defendant claimed on writ of error that the
ordinance was invalid and in violation of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Held, that the ordinance was invalid' in so far as it
penalized the making and selling of bread in loaves weighing less than one
pound. Allion v. Toledo (zgi8, C. P. Lucas County, Oh.) 28 Oh. Super. &
C. P. Dec. 337.
Police power regulation of the sale of foodstuffs is commonly intended-to
protect the public health from injurious substances and bad food. It is often
however, of a second kind, aimed to prevent fraud and deception in the sale
of articles which are admitted to be wholesome enough; regulation to assure
the public just what and how much it is getting. See Freund, Police Power,
secs. 274-275 ; also (1917) 26, YAiE LAW Jou NAL, 67, 416. The section of the
Toledo ordinance in question is obviously a regulation of the latter class, and
must be justified, if at all, as a measure to prevent deception of the public.
The court however, omits a discussion of the fraud element and spends some
effort in demonstrating what needs no demonstration: that small loaves are
no more injurious to public health than large ones. But the court does strike
squarely the difference between the ordinance of the City of Toledo and one
of the City of Chicago which had been sustained in the United States Supreme
Court. See Schmidinger v. Chicago (1i3) 226 U. S. 578, 33 Sup. Ct. 182.
The Chicago ordinance permitted the sale of loaves in fractional parts of a
pound, only prescribing what those fractions should be. There is a genuine
and unquestioned need for small loaves, which the Toledo ordinance forbade
altogether, and here lies ,the difference between reasonable and unreasonable
regulation, between due process of law and a failure of due process.
CoRPoRAioNs-CoRPo'rATIoxs NOT FOR PoFrT-PowER To HoLD MEErINGS AND
EL=wT TRUSTEES OUTSIDE THE STATE.-The American Medical Association.
incorporated under the laws of Illinois, but having numerous constituent associa-
tions scattered throughout the United States, held an election of trustees out-
side the State of Illinois, through its house of delegates, as provided in its
by-laws. The appellant by an information in the nature of quo warranto sought
to oust the trustees so elected. Held, that the election was valid, the statute
which required stockholders' meetings to be held within the state having no
application to corporations not for profit. People ex rel. Hoyne v. Grant (x918,
IlL) Iig N. E. 344.
The general rule as to corporations for profit is that stockholders' meetings
must be held within the state in which the corporation was created. 2 Cook,
Corp. (7th ed.) sec. 589. Some states expressly so provide by statute. -illes
v. Parrish (1862, Ch.) 14 N..J. Eq. 380. No very satisfactory reason has been
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assigned for the rule. Some authorities explain it as the logical result of the
theory that corporations have no legal existence outside the state which created
them. 3 Fletcher. Cyc. Corp. sec. 1635. It has been pointed out, however,
that that theory itself is unsound. See Prof. W. N. Hohfeld, Stockholders'
Individual Liability (igio) io COLUmBIA L. REV. 283, at p. Z7 ff. Other
authorities state the rule as one of public policy and convenience, it being
regarded as unjust to compel stockholders to go outside the state for the pur-
pose of attending meetings. z Morawetz, Priv. Corp. (2d ed.) sec. 488. In
the light of present day business conditions this reason loses much of its original
weight. Corporate stock is widely distributed and, despite the legal presump-
tion to the contrary, the majority of the stockholders in a large proportion
of cases are not in fact residents of the state of incorporation. There is, infact, a decided tendency to organize big corporations in states whose laws arefavorable, though they be remote from the real business headquarters, and
though, too,. a great majority of the stock be held still elsewhere. At least
one eminent writer has declared that even in the case of corporations forprofit, there is no reason why, in the absence of express statutory prohibition,
shareholders should not be permitted to provide for extra-stati meetings, ifdesired. I Morawetz, Priv. Corp. (2d ed.) sec. 488. But whatever might be
said of the general rule when applied to corporations for profit, it is unsatis-factory in its application to non-profit corporations. In the case of such cor-
porations,- especially those having constituent organizations throughout the
country, whose very value depends on the promotion of widespread national
interest in the objects of the corporation, public policy, far from dictating that
meetings be held within the state, would justify the holding of meetings at
any place selected. It has been so held in the case of mutual benefit associations.
Derry Council No. 40, 1. 0. U. A. M. v. State Council J. 0. U. A. M. (i9oo)
197 Pa. 413, 47 At. 2o8; Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Fraley(igoo) 94 Tex. 2oo, 59 S. W. 879. The decision of the principal case is a
welcome extension of the rule to other corporations not for profit and is of
considerable practical interest. See (1918) 56 Nat Corp. Rep. 477.
Emir~nxT DOmAiN-PRoPERmY ALREADY DEvoTED TO PUBuC USE-CDMPENSA-
TION TO COUNTY FOR FLOODING PUBLIC RoAD.-The United States constructed
a dam in the Cumberland River which resulted in permanently flooding a
public road in Wayne County, Ky., the fee of the road being in the abutters.
The county thereupon opened a new road in lieu of the flooded portion of the
old, and brought suit against the United States to recover the cost of con-
structing the new road. Held, that the county was entitled to recover, since
the easement which it held in trust for the public must be regarded as Trivate
property within the prohibition of the fifth amendment forbidding the taking
of private property without just compensation. Wayne County v. United
States (Apr. 22, 1918) U. S. Ct CL No. 32713.
Public jaroperty of a county, such as a street or bridge, is not within the
protection of the state constitution when appropriated by the state legislature
for another public purpose. Heffner v. Cass and Morgan Counties (i9oi) 193
Ill. 439, 62 N. E. 2oi; cf. Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston (1893) i58 Mass. 5o9,
33 N. E. 695. But it would seem that such property might well be deemedprivate property with respect to a taking by a different sovereignty, the
national government. This appears to have been the holding in certain cases
involving the condemnation by the United States of certain municipal property
for the site of fortifications. Nahant v. United States (I9O5, C. C. A. Ist) 136Fed. 273, 70 C. C. A. 653 note; United States v. Nahant (i907, C. C. A. ist)
153 Fed. 52o; see also United States v. Certain Land, etc. (igo8, C. C. N. H.)
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165 Fed. 783; United States v. City of Tifln (igii, C. C. N. D. Oh.) 19o Fed.
279; cf. In re Certain Land (Igo2, D. C. Mass.) iig Fed. 453. On the precise
issue that the United States must make compensation to a county for taking
a public road, there is an almost complete dearth of authority. The Nahant
case favors a contrary decision but contains no adequate discussion of the
point
HusBAN AND WiF--RIGHT oF WIFE To SUE HusBim FoR AssAumT mm
BA m,.-The plaintiff sued her husband for assault and battery. Statutes
provided that husband and wife might contract with each other; that she
might sue alone for injuries to her property, person, or reputation; and that
the damages recovered should be her separate property. Held, that she could
maintain the action. Johnson v. Johnson (Igi7, Ala.) 77 So. 335.
The common law rendered it impossible for a wife to sue her husband
because of the theoretical unity of the relation; which in practice meant that
recovery would be useless, as he would get the damages as soon as recovered.
I Bl. Comm. 443; see i Bishop, Married Women, sec. iog; see Co. Litt. I33.
Enabling statutes giving the wife control of her separate property, and hence
of any damages recovered, have been generally and properly construed to-
permit an action by the wife against the husband for injury to her property.
Mason v. Mason (1892, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 66 Hun, 386, 21 N. Y. Supp. 306;
De Baun v. De Baun (1916) 9ig Va. 85, 89 S. E. 239; Regal Realty, etc., Co. v.
Gallagher (1916, Mo.) 188 S. W. I51; Borton v. Borton (1916, Tex. Civ. App.)
i9O S. W. 192. But there has been an obstinate indisposition to allow a similar
action in tort for injury to the wife's person or reputation. Thompson v.
Thompson (igio) 218 U. S. 61, 31 Sup. Ct III. Strom v. Strom (i9o6) 98
Minn. 427, xo7 N. W. io47, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) I9i, and note; Nickerson v.
Nickerson (1886) 65 Tex. 281; Schultz v. Schultz (1882) 89 N. Y. 644. The
supposed public policy on which these decisions are based (the protection of
the home and the sacred relations of marriage) is believed to be more
imaginary than real. For divorce proceedings are permitted, which wholly
break up the home. And it is hard to see why criminal proceedings, which
are also allowed, do not do more violehce to the sanctity of the marriage
relation than the civil action which is denied. See Fiedler v. Fiedler (1914)
42 Okla. 124, 14o Pac. xo22. The principal case is supported by adjudications
in other jurisdictions. Brown v. Brown (1914) 88 Conn. 42, 89 Ad. 889;
Fitzpatrick v. Owen (1916) 124 Ark. 167, 187 S. NV. 460; see also Sykes v.
Speer (x9o8, Tex. Civ. App.) I12 S. W. 422; Abbe v. Abbe (1897, N. Y.) 22
App. Div. 484, 48 N. Y. Supp. 25. The decisions reached seem to depend not
so much on the phraseology of the statutes as on the judicial attitude towards
them. By some courts they are considered as "statutes in derogation of the
common law," and hence to be strictly construed. Compton v. Pierson (1877,
Prerog.) 28 N. 3. Eq. 229; Union Trust Co. v. Grosman (1917) 38 Sup. Ct.
147. By other courts they are construed liberally as "remedial statutes."
Fiedler v. Fiedler, supra. The liberal construction seems the saner. These
statutes change the common law, to be sure, and add to it. But like survival
statutes, they add in order to remedy long-felt defects; and the new rights
they create should be measured with a view to the needs which called forth
their creation. See Black, Construction and Interp. of Laws, 244.
INTERNATIoNAL LAw-C1TIzENsHIP--ExPATRrATIoN.-X, a native American
citizen, son of a Chinese citizen, proceeded to China in i8go, married there a
Chinese woman and continuously resided there until 1917, when he died. For
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many years prior to I917, he was an invalid, and it appeared that he was
unable to return to the United States. In 1915, the American consul had
refused to register X as an American citizen, on the ground that he had by
his long residence in China raised against himself a presumption of expatria-
tion, which was not overcome by proof of his physical disability or occasional
expressions of intentions to return to the United States. On a petition for
the probate of X's will before the United States court for China, the deceased
was described as an American citizen, his citizenship being a necessary condi-
tion of the court's jurisdiction. Held, that he was an American citizen. In
re Lee's Will, U. S. Court for China, March 30, 1918 (not yet reported in Fed.
Rep.).
The Consul, in refusing to register X, confused expatriation with loss ofprotection, and the rule governing native citizens with that governing
naturalized citizens. Act of March 2, 1907, (34 Stat. L 1228) sec. 2; Depart-
ment of State Circular Instruction of July 26, 191o; Borchard, Diplomatic
Protection of Citizenr Abroad, 695. The native citizen can become expatriated
in one or two ways only: (x) by naturalization abroad; (2) by taking the
oath of allegiance to a foreign state. Act of March 2, i9o7, sec. 2; Newcomb
v. Newcomb (igoo) 1o8 Ky. 582, 57 S. W. 2; Martin (U. S.) v. Mexico, July
4, 1868, Moore, International Arbitrations, 2467. Mr. Hay, Secretary of State,
to Mr. Smith, Nov. 6. 1898, 3 Moore, Digest of Int. Law, 730. As to the
nature of the oath of allegiance required, see Mr. Forsyth, Secretary of State,
to Mr. Emerson, Jan. 23, 1839, 3 Moore, Digest, 719, and Borchard, op. cit.682. Long residence abroad can only have the effect, under certain circum-
stances involving an intent not to return to the United States, of forfeitingprotection, but not citizenship. (1859) 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 356; Department of
State Circular Instruction of July 26, 191o. This was at its worst the status
of the testator during his lifetime, although it appears that he had expressed
an intent to return to this country. A naturalized citizen raises against him-
self a presumption of expatriation by residing in his native country for twoyears or in any other country for five years, although he may overcome the
presumption by proving that he was abroad as the .representative of American
business or for reasons of health which disabled him from returning, provided
he had an intention to return when able. Act of March 2, i9o7, sec. 2;
Department of State Circular of April i9, i9o7, Expatriation, For. Rel. i9o7,
P. 3; Borchard, op. cit. 7o4. The court's decision that the decedent was an
American citizen seems entirely correct.
INTERNATIONAL LAw-IMuNrrY OF STATE PROPERTY FROm ATTACHMENT-
PROPERTY OF BusINEss CoRPoRATIoN ORGANIzED BY YUCATAN.-The defendant
corporation was organized by the state of Yucatan, Mexico, to undertake the
purchase and sale of sisal hemp for the benefit of the producers of Yucatan.
In an action brought against the corporation in New Jersey to recover damages
for the conversion of crops grown on the plaintiff's land in Yucatan some
of the defendant's property in New Jersey was attached. The defendant
moved to dissolve the attachment on the ground that the property belonged to
a foreign government Held, that the motion must be denied. Molina v.Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen (1918, N. J. Sup. Ct) 503
AtL 397.
The principal ground for the denial of the motion was that Yucatan was
not a sovereign state, but a constituent member of a federal union, having
possibly a constitutionally, but not an internationally, sovereign character.
Moreover, even if it had such a status, the corporation having been organized
for business purposes, would not enjoy immunity from judicial process in the
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United States. In this respect, its status is analogous to that of the old United
States Bank. Bank of United States v. Planter's Bank of Georgia (1824,
U. S.) 9 Wheat. 9o4. The immunity of the property of foreign sovereigns
from local jurisdiction is very wide in Anglo-American law. More frequently
it is applied in respect to purely public property. Schooner Exchange v. Mc-
Faddon (1812, U. S.) 7 Cranch, 1I6, a'French warship; Vavasseur v. Krupp
(1878, C. A.) L. R. 9 Ch. D. 35', munitions owned by Japan. But it also
extends to public property devoted to or engaged in commercial pursuits. The
Parlement Beige (x88o) . R. 5 P. Div. 197, a mail steamer owned by the
King of Belgium; Mason v. Intercolonial Railway of Canada (i9o8) 197
Mass. 349, 83 N. E. 876, a railway owned by the King of England, but doing
business in the United States. When the public property is engaged in trade,
the rule of immunity is stretched to its widest limits, and in the opinion of the
courts of Belgium and Italy, and of certain continental writers, beyond
the limits of reason. De Paepe, Etude sur la competence civile d l'gard des
Etats itrangers, Bruxelles, 1894; A. Hartmann (i89o) 22 REv. DE Dn. INr.
425-437; 3 Laurent, Droit civil international, Paris, 188o, 42-io3. The courts
of Belgium and Italy follow the distinction of administrative law between
acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis into the field of international law,
the State being regarded as exempt from suit in the former but not in the
latter case. We make this distinction in our law of municipal corporations,
but not when it comes to the State. For a criticism of the Belgium and
Italian decisions, in favor of the wider rule, see D. Anzilotti, (895) 5 Zeitschr.
f. int. Privat- u. Strafrecht, 24-37, 138-147. The New Jersey decision in the
instant case was therefore not only correct on the principal ground, that a
constituent state of a federal union cannot claim the immunity which is
extended to internationally legal sovereigns, but it places a very proper limita-
tion upon a rule already too widely extended, by stating that the property of
a corporation organized by a foreign State for commercial purposes cannot
claim the immunity from local jurisdiction that might have been extended to
the State itself or its directly owned property. With the larger participation
of Government in commercial enterprise, which seems an inevitable evolution
of the present period, the rule of jurisdictional immunity of public property
may be expected to receive further limitation.
Lin INsURAxcE-AssIGNMENT-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF LOAN CLAUSES.-
One Henry Caplin insured his life with the defendant company without reserv-
ing to himself the power to change the beneficiaries or revoke the insurance.
The policy contained a clause to the effect that the defendant would lend
money thereon to the "insured or owner" of the policy. The insured
"assigned" the policy to the plaintiff and the defendant refused to make
the loan to him. Held, two judges dissenting, that the plaintiff should have
specific performance of the clause since he, as "assignee," was the "owner"
of the policy. Caplin v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co. (i918, App.
Div.) 169 N. Y. Supp. 756.
It is well settled, except in Wisconsin, that the vested benefits of a policy
of life insurance cannot be assigned without the beneficiary's consent. See
25 Cyc. 778 and cases cited n. 97. But this does not mean that the same con-
tract which vests the interest of the beneficiary may not expressly reserve a
power in the insured to convert the policy into cash, or effect a loan to its full
value, and thus defeat the beneficiary's interest. And so it was held in
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Healy (1898, N. Y.) 25 App. Div. 53, 49 N. Y. Supp.
29 (borrowing power in the "holder"). Reservation of this power of
defeasance in the "insured or owner," like reservation in the policy's "holder,"
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would seem fairly to imply a further power in the insured to alienate thisinterest of his. See Travelere" Ins. Co. v. Healy, supra. This is analogous
to the doctrine that the beneficiary may-in the absence of express provision
to the contrary-assign whatever interest he has in a policy. See He-wlett v.Home for Incurables (i89i) 74 Md. 350, 24 AU. 324; Connecticut Mutual Life
In. Co. v. Saldwsin (1885) 15 R. I. io6, 23 AtL 1o5; and cf. in this connec-
tion (rg95) 24 YAL LAw JoURAr .,- 433. What diffculty there is in thisbranch of the principal case appears to arise in giving preference to either
of what the dissent regards as two inconsistent tendencies in a poorly drawnpolicy: the insured may not change his beneficiary or revoke the insurance;yet the "insured or owner" may borrow to the limit of its value.
Equity will refuse specific performance of an agreement to borrow money.Rogers v. Challis (x859, Rolls Ct) 27 Beav. 175. In such a case the damages
at law are clearly adequate. The same rule has been applied to a contract toloan. Sichel v. Mosenthal (1862, Rolls Ct.) 30 Beav. 371; Conklin v.People's Bldg. & Loan Assn. (1886, Ch.) 41 N. J. Eq. 20, 2 Atl. 615. So -ar
as this is based on the theory of mutuality, it would appear to be without
sound foundation. See CoMMENrs (1917) 27 YALE LAW JouaRA, 261. Sofar as the desired loan can be procured elsewhere, at, perhaps, a higher rate
of interest, there is no call for equity to interfere. Where the loan cannotbe procured elsewhere, and the defendant knew of the special purpose to
which the money was to be applied, special damages are recoverable. See(1918) I8 CoL. L. Rsv. 17o. But even special damages must often be con-
ceded inadequate. It has been said that there is hardship in forcing a loanfrom a man, to one whose credit is not such that he can borrow elsewhere. See(1x98) 18 CL. L. REV. 491; see also Conklin v. People's Bldg. & Loan Assn.,
supra. But where the contract is fairly made, one who repents of his bar-gain should not be allowed by crying hardship to escape performance andinflict greater hardship on the other party. In the principal case even the
argument of hardship does not apply. The insurer does not suffer, since the
amount of the loan is limited to the value of its own policy. And as such apolicy would probably not be acceptable security for borrowing elsewhere, the
case seems clear for the decree of specific performance.
LiurrATioN op ACTIONS-AMENDMENTS---CHANGING FROM EQUITABLE TO LEGAL
REmED" AFTER STATUTE HAS Ru.--The plaintiff filed a bill in equity in thefederal District Court for the District of Nebraska, seeking on account of thedefendants' fraud the cancellation of a deed given in an exchange of lands.The master in chancery reported that the plaintiff had lost his right to equitable
relief because, after learning of the fraud, he had cut timber on the land 'eceivedfrom the defendants; the case was transferred to the law side of the court,
and the plaintiff amended his complaint and asked for a judgment for damagesfor deceit. To the amended complaint the defendant pleaded the Nebraska
statute of limitations. Held, that filing the original complaint for equitable
relief prevented the statute of limitations from continuing to run as against the
claim for relief at law set up by the amendment. Friederichsen v. Renard
(I918, U. S.) 38 Sup. Ct 450.
See CoMMErrs, p. 1053.
MoNoos 
-SHERmN Acr--CoxMBiNATION or NoN-ComPENG Paoucs-
"TYING CLAusEs" iN LxASES.-In a government suit to dissolve an alleged
combination of manufacturers of shoe machinery in restraint of trade, the
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bill charged a general scheme of monopoly, evidenced and carried out by (i)
uniting in one corporation the business of several competing manufacturers;
(2) subsequent acquisitions of competing businesses, patent rights, etc.; (3) a
system of leasing shoe machinery with "tying clauses" in the leas~s, whereby
the monopoly was extended and perpetuated. The District Court found on
the facts that there was no substantial competition between the machines
manufactured by the constituent companies before the combination; that
neither the purpose nor the effect of the subsequent acquisitions was in any
substantial degree to suppress competition; that the so-called "tying clause"
in the leases were reasonable agreements made for legitimate business reasons,
and not for the purpose or with the effect charged in the bill; that the general
monopolistic intent alleged had not been proved; and that the defendant com-
pany's very large share of the total business in shoe machinery had been
secured through its lawful patent monopoly of the best machines, combined
with unusual business efficiency. From a decree for the defendants the United
States appealed to the Supreme Court. Held, that in a case involving con-
flicting testimony on all the issues, most of which was heard in open court,
great deference should be given to the findings of the trial judges; that these
findings were justified by the evidence and should be affirmed; and that the
facts proved did not show any violation of the Sherman Act. Day, Pitney
and Clarke, JJ., di.senting. (McReynolds and Brandeis, JJ., took no part in
the decision) United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. (I918, U. S.) 38
Sup. Ct 472.
See COMMENTS, p. 1060.
MORTGAGES-RIGHTS AND POWERS OF SUCCESSIVE MORTGAGEES-ASSIGNMENT OF
RENTS AND PRoFrrs.-The holder of a fourth mortgage brought suit to fore-
close and obtained a receiver to collect the rents in accordance with a
provision in the mortgage deed. The owner of a prior mortgage, who was
made a party, claimed the rents collected by the receiver by virtue of a pro-
vision in his mortgage deed giving him a right to enter and receive the rents
and concluding "and said rents and profits are, in the event of any default,
hereby assigned to the mortgagee. Held, reversing the decision of the
Appellate Division, that the rents so collected belonged to the holder of the
fourth mortgage. Sullivan v. Rosson (I918, N. Y.) iig N. E. 405.
Even in the absence of any provision in the deed it is not unusual for
equity to appoint a receiver of the rents and profits in case the security is
inadequate. In such case, however, the mortgagee has no right to rents
accrued prior to the receivership decree. A junior mortgagee who takes
possession in person or by a receiver is entitled to the rents collected prior
to a similar taking of possession by the senior mortgagee. Ranney v. Peyser
(i88o) 83 N. Y. i; Madison Trust Co. v. Axt (i91) 146 App. Div. 121, 130
N. Y. Supp. 371. This is true even though the rents are expressly pledged
as security to the senior mortgagee. Freedman's Say., Etc., Co. v. Shepherd
(1887) i27 U. S. 494, 5o2; 8 Sup. Ct. 125o. The reason for this is that such
a provision is not an assignment; it gives to the mortgagee no right but only
a power to create a right to the rents by the act of entry or by having a
receiver ,appointed. Before the exercise of this power the right to the rents
is still in the mortgagor, and the latter has both the power and the privilege
of dealing with them as he pleases, as by reducing the amount of the rental,
or assigning his right to a third party. Frank v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co.
(i8go) 122 N. Y. 197, 221; 25 N. E. 332. One who claims the rent by virtue
of an assignment from the mortgagor should therefore be preferred over
another who has previously been given a mere power that he has not yet
I085
YALE LAW JOURNAL
exercised at the time of the assignment It would be otherwise in case the
holder of the power has a contract right also that the rents shall not be
assigned. If the assignment antedates the power, as it did in the principal
case, it nullifies the power altogether, and rents collected under the supposed
power belong to the previous assignee. Harris v. Taylor (i898) 35 App. Div.
462, 54 N. Y. Supp. 864. Such an assignee can sue the tenant for the rents.
Thomson v. Er.rkine (igoi, App. T.) 36 Misc. 2o2, 73 N. Y. Supp. 166. The
assignment is valid even though the assignee's right is conditional upon
default by the mortgagor. State Bank v. Cohen (xgio, Spec. T.) 68 Misc.
138, i23 N. Y. Supp. 747. It would seem to be entirely immaterial whether
the assignment is effected by a separate document, as in Harris v. Taylor, or
by appropriate words in the mortgage deed, as in Thomson v. Erskine and in
the principal case. In the latter case, however, the provision may be given
the interpretation that the words of assignment are merely redundant and
refer only to rents and profits collected after possession has been taken by
the mortgagee or by. his receiver. In re Banner (i9o7, D. C. S. D. N. Y.) 149
Fed. 936; In re Israelson (i916, S. D. N. Y.) 23o Fed. iooo; Abrahams v.
Berkowitz (I911) 146 App. Div. 563, 131 N. Y. Supp. 257. This was the con-
struction given in the principal case, with the result that both mortgagees were
held to have no right by assignment but only a power to create rights by
entry or by a receivership, and the junior mortgagee was preferred because
he exercised his power first. Such an interpretation may be reasonable, but
the opinion of the lower court to the contrary, reported in (915) i66 App.
Div. 68, i5i N. Y. Supp. 613, is very persuasive.
NEGLIGENCE-INJuRY To VOLUNTEER IN WHosE PaESENCE THE DEFENDANT
HAS AN INTEREsT.-The plaintiff, a professional dancer, by consent of the
defendants, voluntarily attended and took part in the rehearsals for a revue
to be given by the defendants, in the hope that she would thereby obtain an
engagement in the revue when produced. She was under no contract with the
defendants. While attending a rehearsal, she was injured by the negligence
of a servant of the defendants. Held, that the plaintiff was a "volunteer with
a private interest," and as such not in common employment with the defendants'
servant, and so was entitled to recover her damages from the defendants.
Hayward v. Moss Empires Limited (1917, C. A.) 117 L. T. Rep. 523.
Ordinarily a mere volunteer assisting in the master's work is, as regards
the master, in no better position than a trespasser, and cannot claim higher
protection than that the master himself, after learning of his presence, shall
not wilfully or carelessly injure him. Degg v. Midland R. R. Co. (1857, Exch.)
I H. & N. 773. Consequently, if injured by the negligence of a servant, he
cannot recover against the master. Eason v. S. & E. T. R. R. Co. (i886) 65
Tex. 577; see (1918) YALE LAw JOURNAT, 415. A mere licensee stands in much
the same position. Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co. (1893) 77 Md. 535, 26
Atl. 973. But a licensee who is on the premises on the owner's business, or on
business in which both have a common interest, is entitled to the same rights
as an invitee. Holmes v. N. E. R. R. (187i) L. R. 6 Ex. 123. There being
no difference in rights, there seems little reason for the distinction in term$
drawn by the English cases. And American cases call such persons invitees;
in fact many cases seem to say that this is the test of an invitee: whether he
is there for the benefit of the owner, or whether there is some mutuality of
interest in the subject of the visit Plummer v. Dill (1892) 156 Mass. 426, 31
N. E. 128; Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co., supra; Clopp v. Mear (i8go)
134 Pa. 203, i9 Atl. 5o4. To such persons, English and American authorities
agree, the owner is under a general duty of care to prevent injury; he is
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responsible to them for his own negligence and that of his servants. Indermaur
v. Dames (1867, Ex. Ch.) L. R. 2 C. P. 311; Clopp v. Mear, supra. Had the
plaintiff gone on the stage without invitation, merely to apply for employment.
she might have been considered a mere licensee. Cf. Larmore v. Crown Point
Iron Co. (1886) Ioi N. Y. 391, 4 N. E. 752. On the other hand, in the actual
case her position approached closely that of a fellow servant, and to apply
the fellow servant rule to her would have involved no great extension of it. The
rule was first developed as an application of the broader doctrine of assump-
tion of risk. See Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Ry. Co. (1842, Mass.) 4 Met.
49; Hutchinson v. York, etc. Ry. Co. (i85o) 5 Ex. 343, 351 ff. And the view
that assumption of risk necessarily depends on contract seems unsound. 3
Labatt, Master & Servant (2d ed.) sec. 1285 ff. It is better explained along
the lines of volenti non fit injuria. But the fellow servant rule itself has been
much criticized as an unwarranted outgrowth of this principle, and a further
extension of it, however slight is hardly to be desired.
PROXIMATE CAUSE-INTERVENING Acr OF INDMxFnDNT WRONGDOER-AS a
result of the defendant's negligence the plaintiff was knocked unconscious and
his goods spilled from his wagon. While he was unconscious, some bystander
stole the goods. The plaintiff brought action against the defendant for the
loss. Held, five judges dissenting, that he could recover for the goods which
were stolen, since the accident was the proximate cause of the theft. Brower
v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. (I918, N. J. Ct Err.) 1o3 Atl. x66.
A burglar broke into the plaintiff's house and left scattered about and unpro-
tected certain clothing of the plaintiff. While thus exposed, it was damaged
by moths. Having been insured by the defendant company against "direct
loss by burglary," the plaintiff sued for the loss caused by the damage to the
clothing. Held, six judges dissenting, that he could not recover, since the
damage was not a direct result of the burglary. Downs v. New Jersey
Fidelity, etc., Ins. Co. (1918, N. J. Ct Err.) 1o3 Atl. 2o5.
While it is impossible to reduce to consistency the mass of decisions on
the question of proximate cause in torts, and especially on the effect of the
intervening act of an independent wrongdoer, the better view is that the first
wrongdoer may still be held liable for the damage, if the intervening act was
reasonably to be anticipated. Lane v. Atlantic Works (1872) III Mass. 136;
Daneschocky v. Sieben (I917, Mo. App.) 193 S. W. 966. The tendency to hold
only the last wrongdoer has been much stronger where his act was not merely
negligent but also wilful and criminal; but even in such cases there is
respectable authority for the view that the defendant should be held if the
wilful intervention of the third person was a natural and probable sequence.
Salmand, Torts (4th ed.) 134; Henry v. Dennis (1883) 93 Ind. 452; contra,
Milostan. v. Chicago (1909) 148 Ill. App. 54o. The Brower case appears to
be a sound application of this principle. Nor is it necessarily inconsistent
with the decision in the Downs case. Were the burglar being sued, no doubt
his acts might have been held to be the proximate cause of the damage to
the plaintiff's clothes; but the actual issue in the Downs case was the question
of construction-the meaning of the words "direct loss by burglary." In con-
struing policies insuring against "direct loss by fire," the courts have said that
the word "direct"' has no significance, and, whether used or not, the fire must
be the proximate cause of the loss or damage. O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co.
(19o9) 140 Wis. 388, 122 N. W. 1o38; see also, Bird v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co.
(1917, N. Y. App. Div.) 167 N. Y. Supp. 707. Fire insurance contracts are
construed strongly in favor of the insured, and the company has been held
liable for goods stolen during a fire as the proximate result thereof. Wit heraUl
1087
YALE LAW JOURNAL
V. Maine Ins. Co. (186I) 49 Me. 2oo. ,Likewise in burglary insurance thepolicy will be interpreted favorably to the insured. Bankers" Mut. Cas. Co. v.State Bank (xgo6, C. C. A. 8th) x5o Fed. 78. It would seem, therefore, thatthe court might well have found the loss in the Doums case within the mean-
ing of the policy without straining its language.
SALs-WA uq NTms--IxPMI WAXEANTY or WHolusormENss oF Fon.-Theplaintiff purchased and ate at -the defendant's drug store ice cream manufac-
tured by the defendant. In an action for damages for illness caused by thepresence in the cream of tyrotoxicon, a filth product, the trial court charged
that the defendant impliedly warranted the cream wholesome and fit to eat.Held, that the instruction was correct Race v. Krum (1g8, N. Y.) xi8 N. E-
853.
See CO MENTS, p. io6.
TAxATION-FomGN CoapoArioNs-ExcIsz TAx BASED ON ATORIZECAPITAL STocx INVAM.--A Massachusetts statute of I9O9 required everyforeign corporation there doing business to pay an annual excise tax of one-fiftieth of one per cent of the par value of its authorized capital stock, the
amount of such tax not to exceed $2ooo in any one year. A statute of 1914
required every corporation subject to a tax under the xo9g law to pay an
additional tax of one one-hundredth of one per cent of the par value of its
authorized capital stock in excess of ten million dollars. Under these statutes
taxes were assessed against a New York corporation, engaged in both inter-
state and local business, whose total capital stock was $45,oooooo and of whose
assets not more than V14 per cent were invested in Massachusetts. The tax
was paid under protest and suit was brought to recover it back on the ground
that the tax was in violation of the commerce clause of the federal constitu-
tion. Held, that the tax was invalid as a burden on interstate commerce, sincethe two statutes must be construed as part of a single scheme and imposed atax, without limitation of amount, upon the corporation's total authorized
capital. International Paper Co. v. Commonwealth of Mass. (i918, U. S.)
38 Sup. Ct 29z
See CoMMENTs, p. 1o74.
TAxATION-IHERITANCE TAXES-FEDERAL AND FOREIGN STATE INHERITANCETAXES AS DEDUCTiBLE ADMINISTRATION ExPENsEs.-In commuting the Con-
necticut inheritance tax upon the estate of a resident testatrix, inheritance
taxes paid to other States and to the United States were deducted to ascer-
tain the net estate taxable under the Connecticut Act Section 5 of that Actprovides that "the net estate for taxation purposes shall be ascertained by
adding to the appraised value of the inventoried estate [certain items] anddeducting therefrom ... expenses of administration.., and losses incurredduring the settlement of the estate in the-reduction of choses in action topossession,..." The tax commissioner appealed. Held, that these deduc-tions were proper. Corbin v. Toumshend (1918, Conn.) 1o3 At. 647.
See CoMEmNs, p. 1o55.
ToRTs-L.ABR UNIONS-INuNcTION AGAINST RULE FIXING MINIMUM Num-
mE OF Emw't.oys.-The plaintiff corporation was proprietor of a moving-picture and vaudeville theater. The defendants were officers and members of alabor union of musicians. A rule of the union specified the minimum number
of musicians to be employed at each theater in the city, and forbade members
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of the union under penalty of fine or expulsion to work at any theater where
a smaller number was employed. The number specified for the plaintiff's
theater was five, while the plaintiff desired to employ only one. During the
summer of 1916 the union rule had been relaxed and the plaintiff had hired a
single union organist under an employment terminable at will. Thereafter the
defendants notified the plaintiff that the rule was to be enforced. The plaintiff
thereupon filed its bill for an injunction. It appeared that the union organist
was ready to continue in the plaintiff's employ, except for the union rule, and
that the plaintiff could secure a non-union organist only at higher wages. Held,
that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction against the enforcement of the
rule. Haverhill Strand Theater v. Gillen (1918, Mass.) 1I8 N. . 67z.
The plaintiff's right, the court says, is "the right to the free flow of labor."
This right is limited by the privilege of each individual musician to refuse to
enter the plaintiff's employ-a privilege which may be exercised from any
motive whatsoever. It is further limited by the privilege of each musician to
persuade his fellow musicians not to enter the plaintiff's service, provided the
means of persuasion and the purpose of it are such'as the law deems justifiable
What means and what purposes shall be deemed justifiable are questions which
must ultimately rest upon economic theories. Consequently it is not surprising
that the decisions in labor cases are conflicting. Only one decision on facts
precisely like those of the principal case has been found. There the injunction
was denied. Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians' Assn.
(i912) 118 Minn. 4io, 136, N. W. io09. The basis of that decision was
that what one employee is privileged to do singly any number may law-
fully agree to do jointly-a principle which the Massachusetts court admits
only when the purpose of the combination is thought to be justifiable.
Interference by a union for the purpose of raising wages or getting 
better
working conditions is admittedly justifiable. Combined interference was
also held legal when the purpose was to secure for one of 
two unions a
larger share of the work formerly done by both. Pickett v.. Walsh 
(I9o6)
192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753 (union masons combined to refuse to lay
bricks unless they could also get the work of pointing 
the mortar). The
defendants in the principal case contended that their action 
came within the
rule of Pickett v. Walsh. But the court distinguished that case-on the 
ground
that there the contractor wanted the pointing done by some 
one, while here the
defendants' purpose was to force the theater to make for them 
work which
the plaintiff did not want done by anyone. The consequences 
of holding legal
a combination for such a purpose would, in the opinion of 
the court, be far-
reaching and dangerous. Whether one agrees with the Minnesota 
or the
Massachusetts case depends upon one's views of the 
extent to which labor
unions should be-controlled by law. That the rule in question 
was unreasonable
and economically wrong can hardly be questioned; but 
whether such excessive
demands should be checked at once by legal interference, or 
be left to be dealt
with by counter-action on the part of employers and by the 
force of public
opinion is another matter. It is a serious question whether 
labor unions will
best learn wisdom or self-restraint by legal compulsion 
or by the experience
to be derived from greater freedom of action. It-may be 
worth noting that the
Massachusetts court did not decide the case, as under 
its earlier decisions it
might have done, on the narrower ground that enforcement 
by fine made the
rule of the union illegally corcive. See Willcutt & Sons 
Co. v. Driscoll (1907)
2oo Mass. 1IO, 85 N. E. 897; contra, Rhodes Bros. Co. V. Musicians" 
etc. Union
(1915) 37 R I. 281, 92 Atl. 641. Though this feature of 
the case was not
mentioned by the court, it is probably too much to hope 
that this marks a
recession from a doctrine both the logic and the 
wisdom of which may be
doubted.
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TORTS-MARACTicE-EFFET OF PLAIxnF'S CONSENT iN BAPMING CIVm
AcToN.-In an action on the case brought to recover damages for malpractice
while performing an operation tb procure an abortion on the plaintiff, and
for unskilled treatment subsequent to the operation, the defendant, a surgeon,
demurred to the complaint on the ground that since the plaintiff consented to
an illegal operation she could not recover. Held, that the plaintiff could
recover, since consent to allow an illegal act to be performed upon oneself
does not constitute a defense- to an action against the doer of the act to
recover the actual damages suffered. Lembo v. Donnell (i918, Me.) 1O3 Ad. 11.
Consent to an act prima facie a tort is ordinarily a good defense to a civil
action on the principle "volenti non fit injuria." See Cole v. Searfass (1912)
49 Ind. App. 334, 97 N. E. 345. But it is clear that such a defense may be
no answer to a criminal charge. Commonwealth v. Collberg (1875) 119 Mass.
350, 2o Am. Rep. 328. For criminal law is concerned not with the injury to
the individual but with the injury to society. To hold, however, that the
criminality of the act makes the consent inoperative to bar recovery in a civil
action, when the same consent to a lawful act would bar recovery, amounts in
effect to allowing a plaintiff to recover by virtue and only by virtue of his
having transgressed. There is, then, logical reason for attacking the decision
in the principal case; and in a very similar case the opposite result was
reached. Goldnamer v. O'Brien (1896) 98 Ky. 569, 33 S. W. 831. Yet the
instant decision is supported by another abortion case. Miller v. Bayer (1896)
94 Wis. 123, 68 N. W. 869. Similarly, in cases where breach of the peace is
involved,, the great weight of authority holds that consent bars neither party
from recovery for injuries sustained. Shay v. Thompson (1884) 59 Wis. 540,
18 N. W. 473; contra, Lykins v. Hamrick (1911) 144 Ky. 8o, 137 S. W. 852.
This has been explained on the not very illuminating ground that wilful hurt
is not excused by consent, if it has .no reasonable object. Pollock, Torts
(1oth ed.) 168. There" are other cases where the law finds public policy
better served by regarding the plaintiff's consent as inoperative in order that,
by encouraging civil actions, the criminal may be the more readily detected.
Webb v. Fulchire (1843) 25 N. C. 485 (recovery in quasi-contract of money
lost in a shell game); but see contra, Stewart v. Wright (i9o6, C. C. A. 8th)
147 Fed. 321. In the former case a distinction is taken between the habitual
law-breaker and the person led only momentarily into breaking the law. The
more numerous jurisdictions appear to accord with the rule which helps the
"unfortunate" to indemnify himself at the expense of the "knave." It is an
important and perhaps doubtful question, in determining the wisdom of allow-
ing the civil action, how far this in practice accomplishes the purpose of
securing the criminal punishment of the knave. But even if he escapes the
state, it may be that public policy is well served by penalizing him at least
to the extent of making him recompense the plaintiff. The case has been
discussed thus far as if the tort consisted solely in the illegality of the opera-
tion. The plaintiff alleged, however, not merely an illegal operation, but
negligence in the performance of it and in the treatment after the operation.
To such negligence there was of course no consent The defense, if any,
must be that the plaintiff was particep criminis; that one who engages with
another in a criminal enterprise must assume all risks of injury; that the law
will not aid either to recover against the other for injuries resulting from
the way in which the criminal design was carried out Cf. Gilmore v. Fuller
(902) 198 Ill. 13o, 65 N. E. 84. Here again we come back to a question of
public policy. If both parties are to be regarded as equally guilty and the
injury flows directly from the criminal act, it seems both sounder principle and
better policy to leave the loss where it falls. Where, as in the principal case,
one party may be regarded as the victim of sudden and overpowering tempta-
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tion and the other as a professional criminal dangerous to the community,
the rule which tends most to the exposure of the latter is perhaps to be pre-
ferred.
ToRTs--TEERAPuH ComP i s--FA xuRE To DEV Tm.1x v CoNTAIING
Onzx oF EmpwYErr.-The plaintiff had sent a telegram to a baseball club
offering his services. The telegraphic counter-offer of the club was never
delivered; the plaintiff consequently lost an opportunity he would have
accepted, and was subsequently unable to secure similar work. The defendant
had notice of the telegram's importance, but failed to deliver because of an
error in transmission. Held, that the plaintiff could recover compensatory
damages. Pfiester v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1918) 282 IML 69, xi8 N. F-
407r.
When an undelivered telegram contains an acceptance of an offer to con-
tract, recovery is permitted the sender against the company. Western Union
v. Blackwell Co. (i9o9) 24 Okla. 535, 103 Pac. 717. Nor is there any reason
why the addressee should not also be allowed recovery. Cf. Penobscot Fish
Co. v. Western Union (1916) gi Conn. 35, 98 AtL 341, and note thereon (I917)
26 YALE LAw JoURNAl, 2q5z Courts have indeed refused him a remedy against
the company where a message arrived, but was altered in transmission; but
this has been on the theory that the addressee of an offer can hold the sender
on the contract according to the offer as transmitted; leaving to the sender the
remedy against the company. Ayer v. Western Union (1887) 79 Me. 493, 10
AUt. 495; and cf.-Sherrerd v. Western Union (igii) 146 Wis. x97, 131 N. W.
34i; see also CoMImNxrs (i9i8) 27 YALE LAW JouRxAL, 932, 933. But where
an acceptance wholly fails to arrive, although a contract may have been com-
pleted by its sending, it seems clear that in practice this hardly protects the
addressee; on the contrary, his troubles are likely to be increased by holding
him bound by a contract of which he has no knowledge. In such cases, there-
fore, remedy should be given him directly against the company. This is borne
out by the cases on undelivered offers. There the propriety of suit by the
addressee seems admitted; recovery is contested only on the ground of uncer-
tainty as to whether he would have accepted. FRemedy has been denied him
on this ground. Beatty Lumber Co. v. Weitern Union (1903) 52 W. Va. 410,
44 S. E. 309; see also Ann. Cas. 1914 C 2o9. But the probability of accept-
ance is now generally and properly considered a question of fact. Western
Union V. Sights (1912) 34 Okla. 46i, 126 Pac. 234; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v.
Talerico (igiz, Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 575. Recovery being allowed, the
measure of damages in cases of undelivered or wrongly transmitted offers or
acceptances of contract other tihan employment is, as in an action for breach
of the contract, the loss actually sustained, or the profit which would have
been made, or both. Western Union v. Sights, supra; Postal Tel. Cable Co.
v. Talerico, supra; Hasbrouck v. Western Union (899) io7 Iowa, i6o; 77
N. W. io34. Where employment is offered, if it is not for a definite period
but terminable at will, compensatory damages cannot be recovered, the theory
being that the damages are too uncertain to be estimated. Larsen v. Postal
Tel. Co. (i9u) i5o Iowa, 748; 13o N. W. 813 . Merrill v. Western Union
(i886) 78 Me. 97, 2 AtL 847. But see Western Union v. McKibben (1887) 114
Ind. 511, 14 N. E. 894. But where the period of the contract is definite, the
injured party is held entitled to full compensatory damages. Western Union
v. Valentine (1885) 18 IlL App. 57; McGregor v..Western Union (igoo) 85
Mo. App. 3o8. See also 37 Cyc. 1766. The principal case properly follows the
litter rule, and since the plaintiff used due diligence in attempts to find other
employment, permits a recovery not only for the contract salary, but also for
loss of reputation and skill, through lack of practice.
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